A Model For Modern Nonlinear Noncontiguous Operations: The War In Burma, 1943 To 1945 by Major John Atkins RLC

Author:Major John Atkins RLC [RLC, Major John Atkins]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, United States, Europe, General, Germany, Asia, Japan
ISBN: 9781782893752
Google: -wlvCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2014-08-15T05:04:29+00:00

CHAPTER THREE — A BETTER MODEL? THE BURMA CAMPAIGN COMPARED TO OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE AND DESERT STORM.

As discussed in the introduction to this paper, FM 3-0 provides two examples of nonlinear, noncontiguous warfighting operations; the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the US intervention in Panama in 1989. The writers of FM 3-0 intended to provide modern examples about which young officers would have some basic knowledge. Certainly both of these campaigns contain examples of noncontiguous and nonlinear warfighting operations and both are currently well known. Both, however, have weaknesses that reduce their relevance as examples to any officer and, more importantly, to joint planners. By studying the Burma campaign, the modern military professional will develop a clearer understanding of the inherent difficulties of Joint nonlinear, noncontiguous operations. They will also be able to examine concepts that provide possible solutions to the problems of fighting in dispersed AOs. Admittedly there are limitations with the study of any campaign, and Burma is no exception, particularly because of the differences in technology between the 1940’s and the present. Despite these differences the Burma campaign offers a more relevant model for nonlinear, noncontiguous operations. In addition, the description of modern nonlinear, noncontiguous operations that is provided in FM 3-0 is much closer to the Burma model than Operations DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE.

In Defeat into Victory, Slim suggests that conventional formations operating on the dispersed battlefield of the future should be equipped and conceptually prepared for movement and sustainment by air. In these terms, the description provided in FM 3-0 of nonlinear, noncontiguous operations could be more closely applied to Slim’s commentary, and the Burma campaign as a whole, than to Operations Desert Shield and Just Cause. FM 3-0 states that sustaining operations, “may depend on CSS moving with manoeuvre units or delivered by air.”{67} According to Colonel Christopher Paparone, a US Army logistician who served in the Gulf and in Panama, the ground forces in Operation Just Cause did not depend entirely on air LOCs. He states that ground LOCs, “ were opened within hours of initial combat.”{68} All required stocks had been in-loaded to theatre prior to the beginning of the operation. Most of the fuel was moved by road to the helicopter refuelling points. During the Gulf War no aerial resupply took place. Some units of the XVIII Airborne Corps were prepared for resupply by helicopter but none of the mechanised units were predisposed to sustainment by air. These heavy formations were restricted by the limitations of their heavy, ground-based logistic system. In Burma, both the 14th Army and Chinese/American forces employed tanks and mechanised formations whenever possible, even in jungle and mountainous terrain. Combined arms Tank Brigades (equipped with M3 and M4 tanks, mechanised infantry and self-propelled gun batteries) were attached to each Corps and resupplied by air in the same manner as the light infantry formations. Fuel, spare parts and tank ammunition were parachuted or air landed to these brigades. The scale of effort required to simultaneously support a number of modern mechanised brigades in a dispersed battlespace, however, would be immense.

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